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ABSTRACT 
Definitions of "telecommunications" vary among authors and usually 
do not conform to CRTC or DOC usage. Since "mythsn are essential 
strategies for uncertainty reductions, these definitions need reassess- 
ment. The paper offers a new definition and traces its application to 
patterns in the global political economy and as a heuristic device for 
communications planning in the twenty-first century. 
Les definitions des "t~lkommunications" varient d'un auteur B I'autre 
et ne correspondent gknkralement pas celles qu'utilisent le CRTC ou 
le ministkre des communications. Etant donne que les "mythes" con- 
stituent des strategies essentielles de r6duction de l'incertitude, il im- 
pork d'examiner a nouveau de telles d6finitions. Cet article propose 
une nouvelle dkfinition et en verifie l'application en rapport avec des 
modkles reliCs B 1'Cconomie politique globale de m&me que son utilisa- 
tion comme moyen heuristique de plannification dans le domaine des 
communications au vingt-et-unikme sikcle. 
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Enormous improvements in communication 
have made understanding more difficult. 
-H.A. Innis (l964:3 1) 
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Reality: what a concept! 
-Robin Williams 
Since 1945, the global telecommunications sphere has already undergone a 
number of major transformations-"improvements," in Innis' phraseology- 
and many of the technological preconditions for widespread and equally 
dramatic transformations in telecommunications before the year 2010 are also 
already now in place. Rapid technological and political-economic change, of the 
sort that has recently been and will continue to be experienced in the telecom- 
munications sphere, tends-as Innis remarked-to make understanding more 
difficult. The element of paradox in his observation is more apparent than real. 
It is often assumed, at least in some quarters, that an increase in information 
flows provides an unalloyed social net benefit, and that the effect of an increase 
in information flows (of the sort associated with recent telecommunication 
developments) is typically to reduce uncertainty and increase general social- 
economic understanding. This assumption, however, rests on an image of the 
economic role of telecommunications which has always been questionable, and 
which has become increasingly tenuous as a result of developments in telecom- 
munications since 1945. 
The basic theses of this article, in the above context, are as follows: 
The most strategically appropriate definition of telecommunications in 
long-run terms, does not correspond precisely to the definition currently 
adopted by the principal Canadian regulatory agency, the Canadian Radio- 
Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), and implicit in 
the current organization of the federal government's Department of Com- 
munications (DOC). 
Myths (in the sense defined below) are essential strategies of uncertainty- 
reduction. The demand for myths increases in periods of heightened uncer- 
tainty. Telecommunications developments since 1945 have contributed to a 
heightening of uncertainty, and hence to an increased demand for myths, 
including myths of telecommunications. 
Most present myths of telecommunications involve serious limitations, as 
well as important partial truths. 
There is currently an urgent need for a refined myth (or set of myths) of 
telecommunications, which comprehends the "realistic" elements of the 
dominant current myths; which also includes certain basic aspects of cur- 
rent trends and patterns in the global political economy inadequately incor- 
porated within these myths; and which can provide a heuristic guide to 
telecommunications strategy for the twenty-first century. 
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The article hence contains a discussion of alternative definitions of 
telecommunications; an outline of the constructive role of myths in situations of 
high uncertainty; a sketch of the strengths and limitations of certain current 
myths of telecommunications; and a framework for analysis of telecommunica- 
tions over the next decade or two, including some obiter dicta that are justifi- 
able but that (for reasons of space) are not wholly documented here. 
The current Canadian federal government definition of telecommunications 
(as embodied in the CRTC mandate and decisions and in the present division of 
labour within the DOC), roughly speaking, appears to treat telecommunications 
as the sphere of information-distribution, with broadcast radio and television by ,' 
analogy being treated as spheres of information-production. The division, fur- 
ther embodied in the distinction between Class I and Class II carriers, is largely 
one of administrative convenience that also reflects the administrative history of 
Canadian media regulation, rather than one with solid analytical underpinnings. 
The separation of the telecommunications sphere-telephone. telegraph, 
microwave and telesatellite systems, and cable networks-from spheres such as 
radio and television broadcasting and film production could be said to have 
reflected a recognition of the greater importance of mass programming and 
programme production in the latter realms. 
Yet this separation has also had its associated costs, from both theoretical 
and policy standpoints. The relatively sharp division within DOC between tech- 
nical and broadcasting branches, notwithstanding the role of intra-ministerial 
coordinating committees and special task forces, has resulted in the independent 
(and relatively uncoordinated) development of distinct-and potentially incom- 
patiblepolicies with regard to different subsectors of the Canadian cultural 
economy. The economically intelligible administrative biases implicit in the 
historical and current division of labour within DOC have thus tended to reduce 
he possibility of developing a comprehensive, integrated, flexible, and feasible J 
ong-term cultural-economic strategy for Canada into the twenty-first century 
Parker et al., 1988:233-38). This problem has been exacerbated by the wide 
'ange of major technological possibilities that have become increasingly 
'easible economically over the past decade, including fibre-optical signal-trans- 
nission (which by the use of digitalization has significantly relaxed former 
:apacity limits on the volume of signal-transmission imposed by the band-width 
'equirements of broadcasting utilizing the electromagnetic spectrum directly); 
ligh-definition television, or HDTV (which requires a wider band-width in a 
)roadcasting context, but which can be accommodated relatively easily within 
he-optical transmission systems); and interactive or "smart TVs" (involving 
:omputer links, and transmission as well as reception capacity). 
These emerging developments enter a communications system that has al- 
'Qdy been radically altered since 1945 by the advent, widespread diffusion, and 
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rapid technological development of the familiar catalogue of innovations, in- 
cluding television itself; mainframe computers, printed circuits, microchips, and 
personal computers; large-scale data banks and increasingly powerful software; 
xerography; laser technology, including holography; long-playing and 
stereophonic audio records, tapes and compact discs; videocassette recorders; 
and telecommunication satellites. The systemic, interrelated and interdependent 
character of these developments has involved major externalities and synergistic 
possibilities; significant new forms of media-competition and media-symbiosis; 
and a radical alteration in the global economic structure of informational and or- 
ganizational space and time. 
These changes in turn have drastically curtailed the capacity of convention- 
al economic theory to analyze, and a fortiori to develop policy prescriptions for, 
the Canadian cultural economy. Some of the difficulties posed for neoclassical 
economic theory by the quantitative expansion and qualitative or structural 
transformation of the commoditized cultural-communication sector are both 
fundamental and obvious: the absence of an adequate quantitative measure of 
information, and hence of the value per unit of information; the fact that the 
sharp division between "producers" and "consumers" necessary for the applica- 
tion of neoclassical efficiency and optimality (or "welfare") theorems is inap- 
plicable in the process of production and distribution of knowledge; the fact that 
over 40 percent (almost half) of Canadian GDP as conventionally measured is 
devoted to communications activities such as advertising, education, com- 
munications media, and research and development, all of which demonstrate the 
empirical irrelevance of the neoclassical economic assumptions regarding per- 
fect certainty, costlessly available information, given technology, and given tas- 
tes and preferences on which standard economic welfare-theoretic conclusions 
rest; and the fact that problems posed by the existence of fixed capital, in- 
divisibilities, overhead costs, unused capacity, joint production, externalities, in- 
creasing returns to scale, and decreasing costs (any one of which raises serious 
conceptual and practical problems for the imputation of relative prices within 
conventional economic theory) are all endemic to the cultural-communication 
sector. 
In this context, not only is conventional economic theory seriously flawed 
as a means of developing policy prescriptions for the cultural-economic sector 
itself; it is also, practically spealung, given the growing quantitative importance 
of the cultural sector, becoming increasingly irrelevant (and therefore potential- 
ly dangerous) as a guide in the determination of overall economic policy. 
Insofar as the telecommunications sector itself is concerned, the current 
conventional definition of the sector exacerbates these problems. Viewed 
etymologically, "tele-communication" is simply long-distance communications. 
Broadcast media, and for that matter printed media and all communications 
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media, with the partial exception of direct, face-to-face oral and more intimate 
dialogue, therefore, to some degree, constitute forms of telecommunication in 
this broader sense. From this etymologically-based definitional standpoint, then, 
the "hiving-off' of certain components of the broader telecommunications sec- 
tor to create a telecommunications sector for regulatory-administrative purposes 
can be seen as at best a matter of administrative convenience, rather than as one 
of inherent logical or theoretical necessity. This "hiving-off," however, restricts 
the capacity to see the cultural economy as a whole, and hence to develop an in- 
tegrated, comprehensive industrial strategy for the entire cultural-economic sec- 
tor. 
There is obviously a need for some division of labour in the analysis, 
policy-determination, and regulation of the cultural economy. No one person 
can be expected to have complete mastery of the internal technological and 
economic workings of all of, say, the cable industry, the educational system, the 
fine arts, the independent film and television production subsector, the computer 
industry, radio-TV broadcasting, and the telesatellite subsector. Yet there is also 
a need for a better balance between such specialized and detailed subsectoral 
knowledge and a more comprehensive and integrated vision of the complex set 
' 
of interrelationships and interdependences among the various subsectors of the 
cultural economy. 
To take the newspaper industry as just one (deliberately off-centre) ex- 
ample, this print medium simply could not function in its present form without 
reliance on a communications system involving interlinked computers, telesatel- 
lites, telephone, TELEX, telefacsimile (FAX) and MODEM services, and print- 
ing systems. This combination is as essential for the Winnipeg Free Press or the 
Calgary Herald as it is for the (Toronto) Globe and Mail or USA Today. Given 
the current definition of the telecommunications sector, however, this set of ele- 
ments is treated purely in terms of isolated external demands on the telecom- 
munications sector narrowly defined, rather than as an integral and 
systematically related part of the telecommunications sector under a broader 
definition. The net result of such an approach hence tends to be to restrict the \ 
social capacity to develop an integrated vision and strategy for the cultural- \ J 
economic sector as a whole, as manifested in the failure to take adequate ac- 
count of intra-sectoral interdependences, externalities and synergistic 
Possibilities; consequently incompatible or contradictory specific policies, 
designed largely in response to the short-run demands of interest groups within 
Particular sub-sectors; and attendant efficiency losses and increases in uncer- 
tainty. 
The global development of telecommunications since 1945 has likely con- 
tributed, on balance, to increased productivity growth, to an accelemtion and 
"'ktion in the cost of information flows, and to an increase in global 
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uncertainty and insecurity. The reasons for this apparently contradictory set of 
i effects are relatively straightforward. Ceteris pribus, the "improvement" of communications within a given economic system increase knowledge concem- 
ing the system and its environment; thereby enhances decision-making capacity; 
and hence increases efficiency and productivity. 
\ 
This logical chain constitutes the core of the standard neoclassical- 
economic analysis of information as a commodity like any other commodity. 
The principal limits of the neoclassical-economic analysis of information stem 
from the inadequacy of these assumptions when ceterispribus no longer holds. 
In the first place, changes in the cost and character of information flows are a 
major cause of structural economic change; new rules of the game; the sys- 
tematic devaluation and revaluation of pre-existing stocks of knowledge; and 
consequent increases in uncertainty. Secondly, it is (although theoretically not 
impossible) historically extremely rare that a particular communications innova- 
tion affects all subsectors within a given communication network or system to 
an equal degree, and hence the typical effect of a particular communications in- 
novation is to cause problems of unused capacity in some parts of the system, 
and severe pressures on capacity (bottlenecks and "information overload") in 
other parts of the system, of the sort that heighten pressures for technological 
and organizational change (to re-establish a balance among subsectoral 
capacities) and correspondingly increase uncertainty. These two factors, as well 
as alterations in the environment attributable to the effects of communications 
system change, are often also associated with shifts in the social distribution of 
effective access to information, on class, regional, sexual, ethnic, linguistic, or 
large-scale (government or private corporate) versus small-scale entrepreneurial 
lines. Such social-economic information-dismbutional shifts can alter the poten- 
tial for the social monopolization of knowledge, wealth and power and hence 
contribute to increased uncertainty, insecurity and instability within a given 
political-economic system. For the foregoing reasons, telecommunications ad- 
vances have contributed both to an increase in productivity and to a high overall 
level of uncertainty. 
Periods of high uncertainty tend to generate an increase in the creation and 
I dissemination of myths, as a strategy of uncertainty-reduction. Pure uncertainty 
I arises most pervasively in situations where the old rules of the game no longer 
I appear to hold, where levels of insecurity (and the associated levels of in- 
dividual and social stress and contradiction) are high, and where the reduced ef- 
I fectiveness of existing social-homeostatic processes has increased the degree of 
instability within a social-economic system. 
, Social myths)provide means of economizing on perceptual, conceptual and 
communication time, and thus provide increased individual and social control 
over time. "Myth" is not a synonym for untruth. On the contrary, historically the 
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most powerful myths owe their temporal longevity and spatial extent to their 
capacity to embody significant and strategic aspects of reality that in some sense 
transcend the limits of a particular time and place. This is not to say that myths 
are abstract. Myths are fundamentally concretely grounded stories, about people 
(or about anthropomorphized gods, animals and plants), and their universality 
emerges in the context of the particular stories through which they are told. 
"Myths" and "models", in their capacities and limits, are in principle isomor- 
phic. 
The other side of the coin is that no myth is completely true: like all models 
or stories, myths involve an anterior determination and a corresponding selec- 
tion of which facts or details are most salient or significant (what Joseph 
Schumpeter, with regard to economic models, called a "vision" of reality), and 
hence all myths are characterized by biases or capacity limits. Moreover, the 
dissemination or distribution of social myths is not costless, and hence the exist- 
ing distribution of wealth and power tends to determine which myths have the 
greatest spatial and temporal diffusion, independently of their "truth"-value. 
Hitler's "Big-Lie" theory-that if you tell enough people a big enough lie, often 
enough, they will come to believe it, or accept it as "t.ruth~'-constitutes the 
basis of a fundamental principle of much effective propaganda and advertising. 
Success in altering social perceptions of "reality" in this context thus depends 
on access to sufficient material-energy resources and power to enable sufficient 
repetitions of a myth that its "truth" appears self-evident. 
The power of myths rests as much on their control of unconscious precon- 
ceptions as on their logic at the conscious level. Hopes and fears, desire and 
revulsion, as well as aesthetic aspects such as the beauty and symmetry or ugli- 
ness and disproportion of a particular myth and the extent to which a particular 
myth generates social-psychological resonances in its audience, or "strikes a 
responsive chord." given a pre-existing mythic framework, are among the forces 
(apart from the factors noted above) that determine the ultimate durability and 
extent of particular myths. 
One of the most powerful telecommunication-based myths regarding the 
current global political economy is still that promoted by Marshall McLuhan 
(1964), which centres on the image of a "global village," and which assumes in 
part that the "linear," bureaucratic (or "centre-margin") structures erected on a 
foundation of print and literacy have been undercut (and will ultimately be 
overturned) by the penetration of electronic media into the global economy. 
This myth presupposes that electronic media have created a "tactile" world of 
multiple "centres without margins," in which humans have been "re-tribalized" 
and converted into "hunters and gatherers" of information, rather than of 
material goods. Telecommunications, in McLuhan's vision of current "reality," 
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are the technological agents of a global Chardinian epiphany in which electronic 
media annihilate space and time. 
This sketch is to some extent a parody of McLuhan's myth in its more com- 
plex forms, but as a representation of the version of the myth that has received 
wide currency, it does not involve significant reductionism. The ideological 
strengths of this myth of the regaining of identity are obvious: it provides an 
image of hope centred on the further development of electronic telecommunica- 
tions media that are already in place, which will eventually result in the har- 
monious global dance of multiple autonomous and independent centres of 
knowledge, wealth and power. Moreover, the myth has no explicit program- 
matic content: the millenium of the global village (in the crudest versions of 
McLuhanism) is an inevitable result of the continued development of tech- 
nological trends that are already apparent, and the primary social task is to un- 
derstand these trends and their social effects, not to attempt to transform society 
in the light of "rear-view mirror7' thinking that will only prolong and render 
more painful this period of transition. Present uncertainties, in the context of 
this myth, are largely failures of imagination. 
The attractiveness of this myth is considerable. It has a populist aspect; it 
requires no action; it accounts for a number of current trends; it provides an 
image of the regaining of social identity and harmony; and it explains current 
uncertainties as a transitional phenomenon. The limits of the myth, however, are 
equally considerable. It has no effective theory of the determinants of political- 
economic power; it hence involves (at least in its more vulgar forms) a reduc- 
tionistic sort of technological determinism, in which mechanisms and processes 
of determination are unspecified or underspecified; and (perhaps most serious- 
ly) its teleological bias inhibits recognition and analysis of factors that may 
retard, or promote, the progress towards the millenium. 
A number of variants of this "global-integration" myth have been 
developed as means of uncertainty-reduction, all of which bear on the question 
of the appropriate telecommunications strategy for the twenty-first century. 
Some of these myths relate to the telecommunications sphere itself; some relate 
to the overall environment of telecommunications. One of the most powerful 
and inclusive of these myths, notwithstanding its major inadequacies as a policy 
guide, for reasons sketched above, is the "free-market" myth. This myth draws 
on the image of the costless and perfectly functioning market incorporated in 
the axioms of basic neoclassical economic theory, and emphasizes the role of 
competition among profit-maximizing firms in generating an "efficient" alloca- 
tion of resources in the short run, and rapid technological change and produc- 
tivity growth in the longer run. 
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In its neo-conservative variants, this myth also tends to rely on an image of 
government as a vast, incomprehensible, slow-moving, unwieldy, and 
monolithic bureaucracy that rewards incompetence, inaction, empire-building 
and obfuscation. The myth, furthermore, ignores or downplays the numerous 
acknowledged within more sophisticated neoclassical theory, in 
which "market failure" can occur and government regulation andfor control be- 
comes necessary to ensure the socially efficient allocation of resources. "Market 
failure" will typically occur when any one of the following phenomena exists: 
indivisibilities; increasing returns; joint production; resource-consuming or in- 
complete sets of markets; transactions costs; interdependent utilities; exter- 
nalities; imperfect competition, including so-called "natural monopolies"; 
public goods; common-pool problems; spatial competition; or divergences be- 
tween private and social discount rates. Ironically, this catalogue of the situa- 
tions in which market failure occurs is at the same time a reasonably precise 
description of the principal economic characteristics of the telecommunications 
sector and of the cultural economy as a whole. 
Yet the "free-market" myth-which provides the ideological basis for such 
government policies as deregulation, privatization, the so-called Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement, the treatment of information as private property rather 
than as a public good, and the related shift from "universal-access" to "pay-as- 
you-go" principles in the information market--undeniably has considerable 
political-economic power. Much of the force of the myth stems from its 
I simplicity (cynics might say its simple-mindedness): "Just let the free market work, and the cornucopia is yours." As with the McLuhan myth, no demands 
for personal action or responsibility are imposed on one who subscribes to this 
myth. Moreover, the image of "big government" as an impersonal, arbitrary and 
inefficient monolith, apart from its populist, "anti-bigness" appeal, almost in- 
variably strikes a responsive chord in anyone who has had to deal on a matter of 
some personal importance with one of the rude, obtuse, rule-bound, inflexible 
and unhelpful petty tyrants that tend to infest the lower ranks of any large-scale 
bureaucratic organization, public or private, municipal, provincial or federal. 
(Most individuals who have had, say, to make a claim on an insurance policy 
with any private-sector insurance company, or to cross swords with a Book-of- 
the-Month Club's computer, will likely have similar resonances, but the power 
of the "free market" myth is such that its bias, or filter-system, tends to put a 
higher weight on experiences of the former type, and a lower weight on the lat- 
ter, so that the net result is a biased, but existentially grounded, prejudice 
against "Big Government," and a corresponding prejudice in favour of "free 
markets.") 
The limits of the "free-market" myth, however, are quite profound, and 
nowhere moreso than in relation to the telecommunications subsector and the 
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cultural economy as a whole. The "free market" functions "efficiently," from a 
social standpoint, only under a highly restrictive set of assumptions, virtually 
none of which is wholly satisfied in practice within the cultural-economic sec- 
tor, as has been indicated in some detail above. 
It therefore appears to be necessary to develop a more realistic myth of 
telecommunications than either the McLuhanite or the "free-market" myths can 
provide, as a heuristic basis for telecommunications policy-formulation over the 
next few decades. The present is an age of high uncertainty, and consequently it 
demands a realistic myth that is adequate to the times. The conclusion of this ar- 
ticle is therefore couched in terms of a set of obiter dicta (none of which is 
defended, although all of them are defensible) that is intended to suggest some 
of the elements that belong in such a myth of telecommunications for the twen- 
ty-first century. 
Before proceeding to these obiter dicta, however, it will be worthwhile to 
indicate some other current myths that have conditioned the form of these obiter 
dicta. Myths that provide alternative visions to those already discussed include 
the following: 
1. The nation-state is now obsolete, as a result of telecommunications 
developments and the development of the transnational corporation, which 
have produced a genuinely global market that transcends national boun- 
daries, and renders the nation-state currently irrelevant. 
2. The world is now, of necessity, becoming a world of trading blocs; in- 
dividual nations, particularly smaller nations, can no longer survive on their 
own, but need to become part of larger politicaleconomic entities. 
3. Capitalism (and/or socialism) is now obsolete; the Cold War is dead; and 
the "convergence" theories of the 1960s can be reactivated. (This myth cur- 
rently exists in both "left-wing*' and "right-wing" versions.) 
4. "Bigger is better": in order to compete successfully in the world market, we 
need to eliminate barriers to the centralization of capital domestically, so 
that our firms have the capacity to compete internationally. 
Over and against these myths, another set of myths, with a different im- 
plicit political-economic agenda, has also developed: 
5. The nation-state is not yet obsolete, and efforts to control foreign political, 
economic, and cultural domination are an essential component of a strategy 
to produce a strong and independent Canada and a more firmly grounded 
international political economy. (Again, this myth has left-wing and 
cenmst or right-wing variants.) 
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6. Neither capitalism nor socialism is yet dead; recent developments in East- 
ern Europe and the USSR represent demands for a reconstitution of 
socialism, rather than a complete renunciation of socialism; the secular 
development of capitalism within the OECD counmes has involved an ex- 
pansion of social welfare structures that has not been completely offset by 
the neo-conservative "blip" over the course of the past decade; and none 
the less, renewed talk of "convergence" is decidedly premature. 
7. "Small is Beautiful": the world is on the verge of major environmental eco- 
disaster, as a result of social-economic developments that have created 
drastic and potentially irreversible effects insofar as ozone layer, "green- 
house effect," acid rain, and other forms of global ecological pollution are 
concerned. The only solution is a radical alteration in global political- 
economic policies and practices. 
8. A "New International Economic Order" is required, to deal with ine- 
qualities in the distribution of global income and wealth, and to cope with 
the currently effectively insoluble problems posed by the magnitude of 
Third World debt. 
I should perhaps confess my own biases with regard to these subsidiary 
myths before outlining the obiter dicta that conclude this article. Without neces- 
sarily agreeing to the precise formulations or biases of the myths outlined 
above, my leaning would be to grant greater credence to Myths (4), (3, (6), and 
(8), with two major qualifications: that the locus of property-ownership implicit 
in Myth (4) is not necessarily appropriate for the telecommunication sector nor 
for the cultural economy as a whole; and that Myth (7) requires further intensive 
study in the immediate future, to refine estimates regarding the timeline of en- 
vironmental effects, the degree of irreversibility of these effects, and the net 
costs of eliminating them. 
In the foregoing context, the following elements appear to be essential J 
components of a policy-oriented myth of Canadian telecommunications for the 
twenty-first century: 
The telecommunications sector needs to be conceived of as an integral 
component of the overall Canadian cultural economy, viewed as an in- 
tegrated whole. 
The telecommunications sector (as currently defined) is principally con- 
cerned with the distribution of information. 
The spheres of production and distribution of information are becoming in- 
creasingly interdependent. This interdependence necessitates a more com- 
prehensive and integrated vision of the culturaleconomic sector. 
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The Canadian economy over the next two decades (without significant 
policy shifts) will be moving towards a demographic situation where the 
centre of gravity of the age-structure of the population and the percentage 
of retired person will be rising; where the number of jobs available for the 
labour force will be shrinking in relative terms; where the effective 
tax-base will be shrinking, while the demands on government revenue will 
be rising; and where there is hence a genuine possibility for a fundamental 
and sustained fiscal crisis of the Canadian state. 
The cultural economy, broadly defined, is one of the few areas where a 
major alteration in Canada's economic future is possible. 
The major economic priority for Canada over the next two decades will be 
the expansion of the information-production sector, broadly defined (in- 
cluding for example, pre-school child care, as well as research and develop- 
ment and broadcast and other media programming). The primary reason for 
this priority is that information-production is labour-intensive in its demand 
for inputs, and knowledge-intensive in its supply of outputs. 
As a consequence of the preceding point, notwithstanding the necessity for 
a government-backed, policy-supported expansion of the cultural economy 
(involving a policy-driven rather than a market-driven strategy of culture), 
the priority of cultural-sector production needs to be dramatically increased 
relative to the sphere of cultural distribution. 
In the foregoing context, government support for the telecommunications 
industry needs to be limited, while government support for the cultural- 
production sector needs to be expanded, as part of its cultural-economic 
and overall economic strategy. 
At some point in the near future, the serious potential negative impact of 
recent government policy decisions (such as the Free Trade Agreement) on 
the freedom of action of the Canadian government with regard to the 
Canadian cultural economy needs to be re-appraised, and if the net benefits 
of the FTA appear on balance, in this larger perspective, to be illusory, then 
the government needs to withdraw (as it is entitled to, under the FfA) from 
the deal. 
This article has arrived at an apparently negative conclusion. It has sug- 
gested that the telecommunications sector (narrowly defined) requires less 
government support, not more support, over the next few decades. The principal 
reason for this proposal, however, as embodied in the obiter dicta that inform 
this proposed new myth, is that expansion of the domestic production side of 
the Canadian cultural economy represents, from a macroeconomic standpoint, 
the highest priority for the foreseeable future; that the telecommunications 
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sector, taken as a whole, is more likely to be self-financing than the Canadian 
informational production sector; and that the induced growth of the Canadian 
domestic information-production sector represents the most secure long-term 
basis for the expansion of Canadian telecommunications. 
The challenge facing Canada, as we approach the twenty-first century, in 
an increasingly competitive global economy, is not simply to increase its 
production capacity, but rather to increase its capacity to increase the produc- 
tivity of its capacity. A narrow concept of the sources of domestic productivity 
growth will cripple this bulwark of Canadian survival. Telecommunications will 
play an essential role in the Canadian economy over the next two decades, but if 
Canada is to survive, this role will be an ancillary one. 
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